BP
Oil Spill Stalls
Gulf Loop Current — Update #1
New Analysis Shows Stall on June 12, 2010
Original Article: BP
Oil Spill Stalls
Gulf Loop Current, 01-August-2010
YOWUSA.COM,
05-August-10
Marshall Masters
In this
first update in this series, Dr. Gianluigi Zangari, an Italian
theoretical physicist and major complex and chaotic systems analyst
at the Frascati National Laboratories in Italy, believes that a
cover-up is in progress.
In what he refers to as "taroccare"
(to falsify), Zangari maintains that that tampering of Colorado Center for
Astrodynamics Research (CCAR) oceanographic imagery for June 12, 2010
represents an attempt to cover up the Loop Current stall event on
that day. Thanks to the US Navy, he has smoking gun proof.
What
brought Dr. Zangari to these conclusions is the result of the natural
scientific process of mining his existing database for new
information. His data spans over a decade and he's searching for a
sign, that natural processes are
re-establishing the stalled Loop Current. If not, we could begin to
see global crop failures as early as 2011.
Alarmed by
the CCAR tampering, Zangari transmitted his findings in a series of
three e-mails to Marshall Masters of yowusa.com on August 4, 2010.
To help readers follow this new development, a series of composite
images prepared from Zangari's e-mails will be presented in
chronological order. Following which, a possible theory as to who
may have corrupted the CCAR database and how, will be presented.
Zangari's Original Paper — 21-June-2010
Dr.
Zangari's original paper published on 21-June-2010 was first brought
to our attention by yowusa.com subscriber Amy Evans on July 22,
2010. While the original paper is not dated, the document time
stamp shows that it was created on 21-June-2010.
Please
note: The modified date was updated when the file was save to a
different location on my own hard drive.
What drew
my attention to the paper was the amount of disinformation attacks
waged against it, so when Dr. Bill Deagle asked me to appear on his radio show with Dr. Zangari, I accepted. I
was sufficiently impressed by Dr. Zangari's integrity and
professionalism to proceed with this series of articles. In this
update, I am presenting the comments and images he sent us via e-mail
on August 4, 2010.
CCAR Sea Surface Height Database Tampering for
June 12, 2010
In this
first of his three e-mails, Zangari has just discovered tampering in
the CCAR database with regards to the sea surface height imagery for
June 12, 2010. Using his own extensive library of captures, which he
refers to as the “OLD”, he compares it with the “NEW”
(tampered) imagery, which is substantially different.
Gianluigi
Zangari
To Marshall Masters and Dr. Bill Deagle
Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 06:02
Dear
Marshall, it has happened a very strange thing. Check these two maps
by CCAR of the same day. The first one (old) is the map I used for my
paper. Now the same map (new) of the same day published by CCAR is
completely different!!!
Why?? What
does it mean? It's very strange. May be it would be better to not
use anymore those data....
GLZ
CCAR Sea Surface Velocity Database
Tampering for
June 12, 2010
As with
the “OLD”, the “NEW” comparison of the sea
surface height noted above, the sea surface velocity imagery for the
same dates is substantially different as well.
Gianluigi
Zangari
To Marshall Masters and Dr. Bill Deagle
Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 06:30
Also the
velocity maps of the same day (June 12) are now different (see
attached). Check the first (old) is that I used for my paper, while
the second (new) is that which is on-line now.
In Italy
we use to say "taroccare" (to falsify).
Regards,
GLZ NRLSSC Wave Height Comparison for
June 12, 2009
and June 12, 2010
With a
decade of experience in this line of research, Dr. Zangari knew where
to look reliable data and found it on the Naval Research Laboratory
Real-Time Global Ocean Analysis and Modeling web site.
Gianluigi
Zangari
To Marshall Masters and Dr. Bill Deagle
Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 08:12
The
correct maps (which show the same results I have published on last 12
june) are collected by the Naval Research Laboratory Real-Time Global
Ocean
Analysis and Modeling. As you can see, they show clearly the breaking
of the loop on june 12.
US Navy v. CCAR - for June 12, 2010
When the
US Navy imagery is compared with CCAR for the same date, the
differences defy dismissive claims of mere coincidence. What more can
we say but “Go Navy!”
On the
other hand, who could have tampered with the CCAR imagery and why?
Or as Dr. Zangari aptly put it, "taroccare" (to falsify).
CCAR Tampering Scenario
No doubt
this evidence of tampering with the CCAR data will raise a host of
theories and denials. However, the one possible theory this article
will address shall be that of corporate espionage, given that the US
Navy, maintained the integrity of their data for the date in question.
In this regard, I will briefly explain my technical background as it
applies to this scenario.
Prior to
starting Your Own World Books in 2002, I worked in the computer
industry for over two decades and in a various roles. In the last
five, I specialized in Internet and Storage Area Network (SAN)
technologies and my client list included AT&T, Hewlett Packard,
Oracle, SUN Microsystems and Lockheed Martin.
During
that time, my most interesting assignment was on documenting the
command and control communication system for the civilian imaging
satellite that took those stunning look down photos of ground zero,
shortly after 9-11.
Since
then, I have developed and maintained all of my our web sites,
message boards, etc. and have had ongoing battle with web site
attacks. Where cranks, kids and nutters like to mess up a site with
defacements and so forth, professionals make very precise, surgical
hits. Hits so clean that it can days or weeks to find them.
For
general disruptions, the pros target like to vulnerable areas such as
database linkages and they are very good at what they do. Over the
years, I've studied their tactics and this corruption, or tampering
if you will, is a pro hit. No two ways about it. Clean. Precise.
Surgical.
Will CCAR
ever admit to it? Heaven's no! That would make as much sense to them
(or anyone else running a data center) as strolling into a single bar
with the words “I have an STD” tattooed on your forehead.
It's just not going to happen.
So how do
the pros do it? For that, a very simplistic view of what happens in
a data center is helpful.
In the
illustration above, the security we typically encounter as users is
through the Internet, which can only be regarded as an “untrusted”
network.
The
firewall is the part of the system that prevents hackers from
breaking in through the “front door.” This is an
ever-evolving game of cat and mouse between security administrators,
and in a world full of nasty nutters, the pros prefer a different way
into the data center.
Inside the
data center, security is another matter, because servers and
databases are “behind the firewall” and therefore
“trusted.” In other words, the barn doors are always open
if you can find your way onto the master communication backbone that
connects servers, databases, etc. within the confines of the data
center.
Obviously,
a phone call that scares someone into a job security panic is the
most effective and expedient way to go, but there are less obtrusive
ways. Or more importantly, ways with perfect deniability.
Namely,
the security sniffers used by Intelligence agencies to monitor
traffic for terrorists, etc. Years ago they were known as the FBI
Carnivore system and as the NSA Echelon system and then everyone
learned the hard way to write about it. ('nuff said.)
Although
government operate these sniffers, they rely on defense contractors
to build, program and support them. That's a lot of people with
access. Ergo, abuse of these sniffers is genuine concern.
The reason
why this is is relevant to this news story is that this surgical hit
on the CCAR data center was carefully aimed at the database, within
the data center's storage area network (SAN). In other words, this
was not a case of breaking down the front door with sledgehammer, but
a clean surgical hit deep inside the CCAR data center itself.
Whoever did this can afford it. You the reader can fill in the blanks
as you wish, as this is all past tense.
The Real Issue at Hand
Doing a
“who shot John” on the CCAR tampering is pointless. Or
as Dr. Zangari so aptly states it, 'Why?? What does it mean? It's
very strange. May be it would be better to not use anymore those
data....”
Beyond
politics, intrigues and speculation, the larger question still looms
over us all. Can the Loop Current re-organize itself? Let us pray
that it does.
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