BP Oil Spill Stalls Gulf Loop Current — Update #1

New Analysis Shows Stall on June 12, 2010

Original Article: BP Oil Spill Stalls Gulf Loop Current, 01-August-2010

YOWUSA.COM, 05-August-10
Marshall Masters

In this first update in this series, Dr. Gianluigi Zangari, an Italian theoretical physicist and major complex and chaotic systems analyst at the Frascati National Laboratories in Italy, believes that a cover-up is in progress.

In what he refers to as "taroccare" (to falsify), Zangari maintains that that tampering of Colorado Center for Astrodynamics Research (CCAR) oceanographic imagery for June 12, 2010 represents an attempt to cover up the Loop Current stall event on that day. Thanks to the US Navy, he has smoking gun proof.

What brought Dr. Zangari to these conclusions is the result of the natural scientific process of mining his existing database for new information. His data spans over a decade and he's searching for a sign, that natural processes are re-establishing the stalled Loop Current. If not, we could begin to see global crop failures as early as 2011.

Alarmed by the CCAR tampering, Zangari transmitted his findings in a series of three e-mails to Marshall Masters of yowusa.com on August 4, 2010. To help readers follow this new development, a series of composite images prepared from Zangari's e-mails will be presented in chronological order. Following which, a possible theory as to who may have corrupted the CCAR database and how, will be presented.

Zangari's Original Paper — 21-June-2010

Dr. Zangari's original paper published on 21-June-2010 was first brought to our attention by yowusa.com subscriber Amy Evans on July 22, 2010. While the original paper is not dated, the document time stamp shows that it was created on 21-June-2010.

Please note: The modified date was updated when the file was save to a different location on my own hard drive.

What drew my attention to the paper was the amount of disinformation attacks waged against it, so when Dr. Bill Deagle asked me to appear on his radio show with Dr. Zangari, I accepted. I was sufficiently impressed by Dr. Zangari's integrity and professionalism to proceed with this series of articles. In this update, I am presenting the comments and images he sent us via e-mail on August 4, 2010.

CCAR Sea Surface Height Database Tampering for June 12, 2010

In this first of his three e-mails, Zangari has just discovered tampering in the CCAR database with regards to the sea surface height imagery for June 12, 2010. Using his own extensive library of captures, which he refers to as the “OLD”, he compares it with the “NEW” (tampered) imagery, which is substantially different.

Gianluigi Zangari
To Marshall Masters and Dr. Bill Deagle
Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 06:02

Dear Marshall, it has happened a very strange thing. Check these two maps by CCAR of the same day. The first one (old) is the map I used for my paper. Now the same map (new) of the same day published by CCAR is completely different!!!

Why?? What does it mean? It's very strange. May be it would be better to not use anymore those data....

GLZ

CCAR Sea Surface Velocity Database
Tampering for June 12, 2010

As with the “OLD”, the “NEW” comparison of the sea surface height noted above, the sea surface velocity imagery for the same dates is substantially different as well.

Gianluigi Zangari
To Marshall Masters and Dr. Bill Deagle
Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 06:30

Also the velocity maps of the same day (June 12) are now different (see attached). Check the first (old) is that I used for my paper, while the second (new) is that which is on-line now.

In Italy we use to say "taroccare" (to falsify).

Regards, GLZ

NRLSSC Wave Height Comparison for
June 12, 2009 and June 12, 2010

With a decade of experience in this line of research, Dr. Zangari knew where to look reliable data and found it on the Naval Research Laboratory Real-Time Global Ocean Analysis and Modeling web site.

Gianluigi Zangari
To Marshall Masters and Dr. Bill Deagle
Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 08:12

The correct maps (which show the same results I have published on last 12 june) are collected by the Naval Research Laboratory Real-Time Global

Ocean Analysis and Modeling. As you can see, they show clearly the breaking of the loop on june 12.

US Navy v. CCAR - for June 12, 2010

When the US Navy imagery is compared with CCAR for the same date, the differences defy dismissive claims of mere coincidence. What more can we say but “Go Navy!”

On the other hand, who could have tampered with the CCAR imagery and why? Or as Dr. Zangari aptly put it, "taroccare" (to falsify).

CCAR Tampering Scenario

No doubt this evidence of tampering with the CCAR data will raise a host of theories and denials. However, the one possible theory this article will address shall be that of corporate espionage, given that the US Navy, maintained the integrity of their data for the date in question. In this regard, I will briefly explain my technical background as it applies to this scenario.

Prior to starting Your Own World Books in 2002, I worked in the computer industry for over two decades and in a various roles. In the last five, I specialized in Internet and Storage Area Network (SAN) technologies and my client list included AT&T, Hewlett Packard, Oracle, SUN Microsystems and Lockheed Martin.

During that time, my most interesting assignment was on documenting the command and control communication system for the civilian imaging satellite that took those stunning look down photos of ground zero, shortly after 9-11.

Since then, I have developed and maintained all of my our web sites, message boards, etc. and have had ongoing battle with web site attacks. Where cranks, kids and nutters like to mess up a site with defacements and so forth, professionals make very precise, surgical hits. Hits so clean that it can days or weeks to find them.

For general disruptions, the pros target like to vulnerable areas such as database linkages and they are very good at what they do. Over the years, I've studied their tactics and this corruption, or tampering if you will, is a pro hit. No two ways about it. Clean. Precise. Surgical.

Will CCAR ever admit to it? Heaven's no! That would make as much sense to them (or anyone else running a data center) as strolling into a single bar with the words “I have an STD” tattooed on your forehead. It's just not going to happen.

So how do the pros do it? For that, a very simplistic view of what happens in a data center is helpful.

In the illustration above, the security we typically encounter as users is through the Internet, which can only be regarded as an “untrusted” network.

The firewall is the part of the system that prevents hackers from breaking in through the “front door.” This is an ever-evolving game of cat and mouse between security administrators, and in a world full of nasty nutters, the pros prefer a different way into the data center.

Inside the data center, security is another matter, because servers and databases are “behind the firewall” and therefore “trusted.” In other words, the barn doors are always open if you can find your way onto the master communication backbone that connects servers, databases, etc. within the confines of the data center.

Obviously, a phone call that scares someone into a job security panic is the most effective and expedient way to go, but there are less obtrusive ways. Or more importantly, ways with perfect deniability.

Namely, the security sniffers used by Intelligence agencies to monitor traffic for terrorists, etc. Years ago they were known as the FBI Carnivore system and as the NSA Echelon system and then everyone learned the hard way to write about it. ('nuff said.)

Although government operate these sniffers, they rely on defense contractors to build, program and support them. That's a lot of people with access. Ergo, abuse of these sniffers is genuine concern.

The reason why this is is relevant to this news story is that this surgical hit on the CCAR data center was carefully aimed at the database, within the data center's storage area network (SAN). In other words, this was not a case of breaking down the front door with sledgehammer, but a clean surgical hit deep inside the CCAR data center itself. Whoever did this can afford it. You the reader can fill in the blanks as you wish, as this is all past tense.

The Real Issue at Hand

Doing a “who shot John” on the CCAR tampering is pointless. Or as Dr. Zangari so aptly states it, 'Why?? What does it mean? It's very strange. May be it would be better to not use anymore those data....”

Beyond politics, intrigues and speculation, the larger question still looms over us all. Can the Loop Current re-organize itself? Let us pray that it does.